COVERT NUCLEAR PLANS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN THE POST POKRAN PERIOD

 There are reports that the Indian government was going ahead with the ambitious nuclear programme, especially after the United States declared its intention to implement the Missile Defence System.  “Satellite images reveal that India has recently expanded a storage area that is almost certainly devoted to rocket propellant and fuel assemblies for these missile systems. Images also confirm that DRDL has erected a large facility dedicated to ground-based stress testing and flight simulations involving the actual missile components,” the Federation of American Scientists revealed in a statement..

On May 17^th, 2000 the Federation of American Scientists (FSA Public Eye Project  showed clear photographs obtained from the SpaceImaging Corporation IKONOS satellite indicating that Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs are going ahead with new explosion plans. The images demonstrated that the these countries  have committed themselves to long-term and highly-integrated networks of military institutions geared towards the full deployment of nuclear weapons.

According to the FSA Report, the  Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) near Trombay, Maharashtra is “the nerve center of the entire nuclear weapons program and includes facilities for weapons design; plutonium production (Dhruva and Cirus research reactors); plutonium separation; conversion of fissile materials into metallic form for warheads; and bomb core fabrication.”   

According to it, “BARC houses extensive chemical production plants to support the entire fuel cycle, as well as a facility for extracting tritium from heavy water for increasing the explosive power of thermonuclear weapons. BARC personnel were instrumental in designing and building the nuclear devices that were tested in May 1998.”

The Hyderabad based Defence Research Complex at Kanchanbagh houses the primary institutions responsible for developing and testing the new Agni-II IRBM and the short-range Prithvi missiles, both of which are leading candidates for nuclear warhead delivery vehicles. “With help from over 20 other institutions and partners outside the Complex, the Defense Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) represents the R&D component of the missile programs. Also in the Hyderabad Complex, the government-owned Bharat Dynamics, Ltd. manufactures the Prithvi with assistance in special metals from the Defense Metallurgical Research Laboratory (DMRL) and the government-owned special metals industry Mishra Dhatu Nigam Ltd. (MIDHANI),” said the FSA report.

“Satellite imagery of the 40-70 Megawatt plutonium production reactor at Khushab and nearby medium-range missile base at Sargodha indicated that construction of the Khushab reactor is essentially complete, and that Pakistan has built a dozen garages for mobile missile launchers and associated logistics support vehicles near the Sargodha Central Ammunition Depot. Dedicated maintenance facilities and launch crew housing have also been built nearby,” the FSA Report said.

 “ New photographs of the Kahuta uranium enrichment complex reveald significant additions in the last 10 years. The Kahuta complex is now a multipurpose "one-stop shopping" weapons production area, with expansion and refurbishment of existing uranium enrichment facilities and construction of new sites for development and ground testing of the Ghauri II/Nodong intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).

 

. According to FAS Space Policy Project Director John Pike, "Pakistan has laid the groundwork for a force of dozens of nuclear-tipped missiles capable of striking Indian cities and military bases."  Another probable reason that speeded up the nuclear ambitions of India, Pakistan and other emerging powers is the introduction of the ballistic missile defense (BMD) deployments  and theater missile defense (TMD) deploymentsby the Bush Administration in the US.

 The Pokhran nuclears tests were not anticipated by Western governments, despite surveillance by military satellites. According to FAS the IKONOS commercial satellite images, taken over the past few weeks, would be able to reveal preparations for additional tests, reported by Pakistani news sources to be currently underway. Even American satellites failed to detect the Indian test preparations detecting new test preparations would be a herculean task. The government has been maintaining high level secrecy in its nuclear programmes. The money and resources India and Pakistan have devoted to nuclear weapons programs will ensure that they will not relinquish their status as nuclear powers.

 India’s Minister of External Affairs, Suo Motu, released a statement last week detailing India’s refusal to attend the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, underway this week in New York. The NPT is an international treaty with 187 member countries that have agreed to work toward the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. "India is a nuclear weapon state," Motu told the Indian Parliament May 9. "The NPT community needs to understand that India cannot join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Statements by NPT States Parties about India rolling back its nuclear programme are mere diversions to prevent focused attention on the basic goals of the NPT."  India also will not join the NPT as a nuclear weapons state, Motu said, citing the failure of the international pact to achieve significant progress toward nonproliferation or disarmament. "The nuclear weapon States Parties to the NPT and their allies have not diminished the role of nuclear weapons in their respective or collective security calculus; on the contrary, new doctrines and justifications have been developed," Motu wrote. "NATO's new strategic concept, announced last year, ten years after the end of the Cold War, goes to re-emphasising a need for the continued retention of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons sharing arrangements within NATO also pose serious questions about compliance. Such developments are clear and continuing violations of the provisions of the NPT."

 Subsequent developments indicate that there was trueth in the Pakistan media reports about Indian nuclear test plans. Just ten days before the fatal earthquake that hit the country the Indian Government officially announced that the he second flight test of AGNI-II long range surface-to-surface missile was conducted at 1001 hours on January 17, 2001 from the Interim Test Range, Chandipur, Orissa in its final operational configuration. “AGNI-II is a two-stage, all solid motor missile having a range of about 2000 kilometres with a payload weight of one tonne and is launched from a mobile launcher. The flight was monitored with shore and ship instrumentation facilities which were networked in real time. The Programme Director, R N Agarwal said that the flight test results have indicated that mission objectives were met satisfactorily. The test firing of Agni II was part of the Republic Day Celebrations.

A jubilant Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee congratulated scientists and engineers of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) for the successful test flight of AGNI-II Vajpayee conveyed his and the nation’s deep appreciation to the DRDO family on this success. The Prime Minister also telephonically congratulated the Scientific Adviser to Defence Minister, Dr. V K Aatre at Interim Test Range, Chandipur, Orissa on this singular achievement. The Defence Minister George Fernandes informed the Prime Minister of the successful launch of AGNI-II.

“The flight was witnessed by Defence Minister, Shri George Fernandes, Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal A Y Tipnis, Scientific Adviser to Defence Minister, Dr. V K Aatre and Vice Chief of the Army Staff, Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi. Defence Minister has complimented the scientists and engineers of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) for this success on the heels of the first successful test flight of AGNI-II on April 11, 1999. Despite the official claims, the exact location of the test, and its true dimensions and other details are kept as top secret by the military establishment. But the people living in different parts of the country –from Bombay and Bhuj to the southern parts of Idukki and Kottayam, experienced serious tremors on the same occasion.  Currently there is insufficient proof to coorelate the arms testing programme and the earthquakes. If the track record of the BJP Government, which tested the first thermonuclear just 20 days after coming to power, is any indication, there is strong reason to point the accusing finger towards the Suffron government’s nuclear plans. Taking into account the dimension of the tragedy that hit the country, the Indian Prime Minister, the Indian Defence Minister  and other establishments connected with the nuclear programme owe  an explanation to the nation.

Gujarath in Indian Nuclear Map: Baroda

 The Baroda heavy-water production plant in Gujarat is the country’s second heavy-water production facility, having been supplied as a turnkey project by the French-Swiss consortium M-S Gelpra. Construction of the unsafeguarded plant, which uses a mono-thermal ammonia-hydrogen exchange  process to produce up to 67.2Mt of heavy water per year, began in 1970. Baroda is operated under the direction of the DAE’s Heavy Water Board and did not begin commercial operations until 1980. The plant is co-located with Gujarat Fertilizer’s Baroda Ammonia Plant, which provides the requisite ammonia inputs. The problems started during the plant’s construction, which suffered huge cost overruns, production cost  increases, and a 53-month delay in commissioning. The plant has subsequently operated at significantly under capacity throughout its life-span, largely due to a lower deuterium content than originally planned. The plant has also been shut down for a variety of reasons, ranging from a May 1982 closure due to a labor dispute to a spring 1988 explosion and fire. The facility was closed again several times in 1996-97 for maintenance of equipment and machinery that had failed.

The Hazira Ammonia Extension Plant in Gujarat state, also known as the KRIBHCO Heavy Water  Plant, owned and operated by the DAEs Heavy Water Board, is co-located with the  Krishak Bharati Cooperative Ltd. (KRIBHCO) fertilizer plant. It  provides chemical and steam inputs. The Hazira facility was commissioned in 1991 and can produce up to 110Mt of heavy water per year using an ammonia-hydrogen exchange process. Although most of the Rs2.64 billion plant was built indigenously, Germany’s Siemens provided the plant with sophisticatedcomputerized mixing equipment, called a Teleperm M plant system. India had previously tried to obtain an “ammonium optimizer” with a Digital Equipment Micro Vax II computer along with  specialized software through the British firm ICI, but the transfer was stopped after the US Department of Commerce denied the export license.

Although there is little publicly available operating data on the Hazira facility, it appears to have  produced significantly more heavy water than its predecessors at Baroda, Tuticorin, and Talcher. It can supply significant amounts of heavy  water to New Delhi’s unsafeguarded plutonium-producing reactors.

 Kakrapar

The Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS), owned and operated by the NPC is located in the earthquake affected Gujarat state.(280) The KAPS-1 and -2 PHWRs have maximum designoutputs of 235MWe, maximum net outputs of 220MWe, and are not subject to IAEA safeguards.  Both reactors were built indigenously by Larsen and Toubro and Walchandnagar Industries, with construction of KAPS-1 and -2 beginning in December 1984 and April 1985, respectively.(282) The reactors’ turbines and steam generators were built by BHEL and useindigenously produced heavy water.They burn natural uranium mined in India and fabricated into fuel at the Nuclear Fuel Complex. After years of construction delays, KAPS-1 went critical inSeptember 1992 while KAPS-2 achieved criticality in January 1995. India’s newest nuclear reactors, KAPS-1 and -2, have avoided the kind of serious setbacks that  plague India’s nuclear power program. Throughout its lifetime, Kakrapar-2 has been India’s mostreliable reactor, performing at full capacity 62 percent of the time, greater than the India-wide averageof 49 percent, but still less than the world average of 70 percent. KAPS-1 has a lifetime efficiency rating of 46 percent. The site may also be the location of a plant to cleanse heavy water. According to the US Department of Commerce, Kakrapar is home to a heavy water upgrade facility.

The KAPS-1 and -2 commercial power reactors add little capability that India’s nuclear weapons program can not attain elsewhere. The plants is believed to be ’ producing significant amounts of plutonium-bearing spent fuel which could be reprocessed and used to build atomic arms. The presence of large amounts of plutonium is also dangerous because the fissile material could be diverted or stolen for clandestine nuclear weapon activities. Plutonium extracted from Kakrapar spent fuel, is undesirable for use in nuclear weapons due to a low concentrationof plutonium-239.

Another nuclear physics insitute located in Ahmedabad, again in the earthquake affected region of Gujarath, raises doubt about its covert activities in a civilian area.  Located just outside the city of Ahmedabad, the Institute for Plasma Research houses the Aditya tokamak fusion reactor.  The center actively supported by the DAE conducts experimental and theoretical research of plasma physics with an emphasis on magnetic confinement fusion and designs for tokamak reactors. Researchers from the institute have also completed a conceptual design for a Steady-State Superconducting Cyclotron. According to infored sources, personnel from the Ahmedabad center and the Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics in Calcutta have been the primaryusers of the Aditya tokamak.

The Aditya tokamak is a fusion research reactor, which uses magnetic fields to confine and heat deuterium and tritium plasma fuel. As part of normal operations, most tokamaks remove and recycle small amounts of tritium, a vital nuclear weapon component. Such a device would also give Indian technicians experience working with magnetic confinement fusion technology, which has applications for a thermonuclear weapons design program. The knowledge gained at the institute is used in New Delhi’s nuclear weapons program.

  Pokharan: Located at the Khetolai military range in the Thar desert, Pokharan was the center of media attention two years ago when the BJP Government conducted a nuclear test just 20 days after coming to power. Pokhran is the site where India has conducted all of its nuclear tests. The most recent, held in May 1998 and code-named OperationShakti-1, were part of what the Indian government said was a series of five tests held as a joint project between the DAE and the DRDO. According to the Indian government, the five tests involved: a 12 kiloton (kT) fission device, a 43kT thermonuclear [fusion] device, a sub-kiloton [0.2-0.6kT] device on 11 May 1998, and two sub-kiloton devices with yields of 0.2-0.6kT on 13 May 1998.

One of Shakti’s chief designers, S. K. Sikka, who also heads the Solid State Physics Group at BARC, claimed that the first stage of the hydrogen bomb comprised of a boosted fission device instead of the usual fission device. According to an Indian press report, one of the low-yield bombs tested on May 13 used plutonium derived from commercial power reactors, raising the specter that India’s large stockpile of unsafeguarded commercial-grade plutonium could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. According to one report ( “New Delhi’s Secret Test Sites Escape Satellite Detection,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 3 June 1998).Indian nuclear  scientists had prepared a test site 10km away from the main Pokharan location where they intended to test a third low-yield device on May 13, but abandoned the test due to a technical glitch and political concerns.

Despite international skepticism about India’s hydrogen bomb claims, the head of India’s AEC, Dr. Rajagopal Chidambaram has repeatedly insisted that New Delhi tested a two-stage thermonuclear bomb, noting that the yield was deliberately kept low to minimize damage to the surrounding area. He added that India has the ability to make hydrogen bombs of yields up to 200kT. Chidambaram later said that India has developed three new nuclear bomb designs as a result of the May 1998 tests.However, independent and US intelligence analysts have publicly doubted these claims, noting that the largest test was of an attempted thermonuclear weapon test, the second stage of which failed, and had a significantly smaller yield than claimed. An analysis by independent seismologists is even more skeptical of New Delhi’s claims, noting that the seismological data indicates there was probably only a single explosion on 11 May 1998, likely yielding 9-16 kT and not more than 30 kT. Data from 13 May 1998, the seismologists say, suggests that the tests could not have yielded greater explosive power than a dozen tons of high-explosives.(357) US Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth told the US Congress that the number of nuclear tests conducted by India were “less than they said.”

The May 1998 tests were not the first time Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee authorized DAE to conduct nuclear tests. Vajpayee had previously given DAE the green signal to conduct nuclear tests, when he acceded to power briefly in the spring of 1996. However, Vajapyee retracted the order when he realized that the BJP was unlikely to win a vote of confidence in parliament. Preparations for a nuclear test had been completed in late 1995 under the previous government of P.V. Narasimha Rao. At that time, the US government was able to detect the test preparations and press New Delhi not to test. US intelligence satellites had detected signs of renewed activity at Pokharan including work to excavate an underground shaft for testing nuclear weapons and installing data gathering instrumentation.

India had previously conducted its first nuclear test, code-named Smiling Buddha, at the Pokharan site on 18 May 1974. Although New Delhi officially called the blast a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” former AEC Chairman Raja Ramanna admitted in October 1997 that it was indeed an atomic bomb test. The bomb used a Polonium-210/Beryllium neutron initiator, code-named Flower, which had been designed and fabricated with some difficulty by BARC scientists. According to Ramanna, BARC personnel took two years to reprocess, purify, convert to metal, and machine the device’s core and to manufacture the implosion lenses [made by the DRDO] and associated electronics package. Although the Indian government says the 1974 test had a 12kT yield, other observers have placed the yield between 10kT-15kT.

While India did not conduct subsequent nuclear tests at Pokharan during the 1970s and early 1980s, additional shafts were dug in preparation for at least two future tests. Those preparations were publicly revealed by US Senator Alan Cranston in 1981 when he said that India had performed “surface excavations for burial of a nuclear warhead — for an underground test.” His accusation was followed by an article in the Indian Express which described the sudden fencing off of a large area near the Khetolai artillery range, and noted that nine villages near the old test site could be evacuated in preparation for another nuclear test.A similar article in the Indian press during 1982 described heavy nighttime industrial activity at the site, and the efforts of the Indian army to cordon off an area near the range. Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee and then former president and defense minister, R. Venkataraman, have subsequently verified the news accounts, saying that New Delhi completed all the necessary preparations for conducting a nuclear test in 1983, but the test was canceled due to international pressure. India used the shafts dug during the 1980s for its May 1998 tests.

According to the Indian government, the current program of tests is complete and India has gained valuable data in the process. That data will help New Delhi refine its weapon designs, create new designs, and enhance its ability to conduct computer testing simulations. The May 1998 tests and related statements by current and former Indian government officials have made it clear that New Delhi has had an active nuclear weapons program since at least the early 1970s. While work and support for that program may have been sporadic, the 1974 test and subsequent preparations for additional tests in the early 1980s are evidence of a nuclear weapons program’s existence. Although India did not carry those preparations to fruition, the test site was maintained and preparations were made anew in late 1995, culminating in the May 1998 nuclear explosions. “While India’s nuclear testing has ended for now, the prospect that the attempted hydrogen bomb test was unsuccessful raises the possibility that Indian weapon designers within the DAE will pressure New Delhi forgo signing the CTBT and leave open the option of conducting more tests in the future,” says a US nuclear weapons monitoring center.

Hardly eleven months after conducting a series of complex nuclear tests at Pokharan, India carried out yet another feat on April 11,  by successfully test-firing an advanced Agni-II intermediate-range ballistic missile. The launch of the missile, which has a considerably enhanced range of over 2,000 km, took place from Wheeler Island off the Orissa coast. It was a perfect launch carried out without a single hitch. The splashdown took place in the designated zone in the Bay of Bengal. “Pokhran -II and Agni-II are a symbol of a resurgent India which wanted to stand on its own and to be able to defend itself without dependence on others. The government reiterated after the Agni-II test-firing that India is committed to "minimum deterrence", to "no first use of nuclear weapons" and to "never use them against non-nuclear states" says an official report about the test.

What lends credibility to the Indian stance is the fact that Agni-II was meant to be a demonstration flight. And, despite the missile technology having reached a point where it could be made operational, India has no desire towards Agni-II's production schedule, let alone any deployment designs. All that can be said about the latest achievement is that it has added a new dimension to India's defence capability and that hereafter no country would dare threaten India. A point to note is that by conducting the Agni-II test India has not violated any existing international treaties.

 Pakistan did not rest content with a mere criticism of Agni-II's test- firing. It lost no time in testing its nuclear capable Ghauri II and Shaheen-1 missiles which are claimed to have a range of 1,500 and 750 km respectively. The swiftness with which Pakistan proceeded implies that it had in its possession ready-to-fire missiles which, as western commentators believe were not its own but acquired ones.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

“We have witnessed continued missile development in Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and India. Add to this the broader availability of technologies relevant to biological and chemical warfare, nuclear tests in South Asia, as well as continuing concerns about other nuclear programs and the possibility of shortcuts toacquiring fissile material. We are also worried about the security of Russian WMD materials, increased cooperation among rogue states, more effective efforts by proliferants to conceal illicit activities, and growing interest by terrorists in acquiring WMD capabilities,” said the CIA Statement by Director, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) George J. Tenet Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on The Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security"as prepared for delivery" 21 March 2000.

“Although US intelligence is increasing its emphasis and resources on many of these issues, there is continued and growing risk of surprise. Our analytical and collection coverage against most of these states is stretched, and many of the trends that I  just noted make it harder to track some key developments, even in the states of greatest intelligence focus,” he said acknowledging the secrecy of nuclear programmes.

“Turning now to nuclear proliferation, the growing threat is underscored by developments in South Asia, where both India and Pakistan are developing more advanced nuclear weapons and moving towardsdeployment of significant nuclear arsenals,” said the CIA Director, who added that the expertise and materiel from Russia has continued to assist the nuclear progress of several states. Denial and deception are the  stated policy of the Indian government. “the hill is getting steeper every year,” he said implying that the threat of nuclear proliferation is growing.

Courtesy: Center for Non Proliferation Studies: